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Résumé / Abstract
In this paper, we use a data set on admissions and enrolments for
entry into the medical school of the Université de Montréal to test the hypothesis
that the admission process is meritocratic and free from discrimination and
arbitrary decisions. The paper analyses the difficulty of choosing among
different categories of applicants in the context of entrance quotas pertaining to
the level of higher education (college, university) from which one applies to
medical school. We use a sequential probit model to show that the performance
variables, as ,measured or observed by the admissions committee through a
variety of tests, only partially explain the committees decisions. The school did
not admit all the best in terms of performance, and among the best admitted,
almost one out of three did not enrol. We explore some socioeconomic
determinants of admissions and enrolments, and suggest an alternative approach
to the admissions procedure.
Dans ce texte, nous utilisons les données sur les admissions ;a la Faculté
de médecine de lUniversité de Montréal pour tester lhypothèse que les procédures
dadmission sont basées sur le mérite et exemptes de décisions discriminatoires ou
arbitraires. Cette étude analyse les difficultés à choisir parmi différentes catégories
de candidats dans le contexte où des quotas ;a lentrée, selon la catégorie détudiants
(collégial, universitaire et autres), sappliquent ;a la Faculté de médecine. Nous
utilisons unmodèle probit séquentiel pour montrer que les variables de performance
académique individuelle, telles quobservées et mesurées par le Comité dadmission
via une batterie de tests, expliquent partiellement les décisions du Comité. Par
ailleurs, il demeure que la Faculté de médecine nadmet pas nécessairement les plus
performants. Et parmi les meilleurs admis, un étudiant sur trois décide de ne pas
accepter loffre de lUniversité. Nous proposons une approche alternative à la
procédure dadmission retenue par lUniversité.
Key words: sequential probit model, medical schools, entrance quotas.
Mots-clés : probit séquentiel, Faculté de médecine, quotas à lentrée.
Cole (1986) has analyzed this particular issue of sex discrimination in admission to medical schools in1
the U.S. He concluded that as far back as 1929, the low representation of women in medicine was primarly
a result of differences in socialization-based occupational choice, not discrimination.
1. INTRODUCTION
The most remunerative professions require that entrants secure a specialized
education. Typically, the demand for this specialized education exceeds the supply
because only a certain proportion of the population has the ability, either innate or
acquired, to meet the exact training and performance requirements of the profession.
In many cases, the corporate bodies that govern the medical profession restrict entry
into medical schools. Such a restrictive practice guarantees a superior quality of
medical services to the general public and a high rate of return to a medical degree
[see Brown (1989) on the determinants of physician incomes]. The allocation of the
scarce educational slots therefore requires an admissions process that selects
applicants on the basis of capability to acquire professional qualifications. An efficient
admissions process should allocate educational slots only on the basis of attributes of
applicants that do not affect their capability to be trained and, ultimately, to perform
in the profession of their choice.
In this paper, we use a data set on acceptances and rejections for entry into the
medical school of the Université de Montréal to test the hypothesis that the admissions
process is meritocratic. The alternative hypotheses are that the admissions process
discriminates on the basis of non-meritocratic attributes of the applicants or that it
manifests subjective valuations by the members of the admissions committee that we
can only interpret as arbitrary. A priori, one would hope that the admissions process
to medical schools would not rely on arbitrary decisions because of the specialized
training required and the importance of achieving eminent standards of job
performance. We would also hope that the admissions process will be free of
decisions that can be construed as discriminatory. Medical schools are highly
selective in admitting students, and scrutinize applications carefully and according to
well-established and closely monitored procedures. As noted in Chiplin (1981), the
existence of a clear-cut set of admissions procedures and guidelines permits the
identification of the hedonic offer curve of decision-makers on the admissions
committee to determine whether there is any evidence of discrimination or arbitrary
decisions.
For example, we can conclude that discrimination exists if, for the same qualifications,
the admissions committee systematically accepts men rather than women. Evidence1
of arbitrary decisions is somewhat more difficult to evaluate. An arbitrary decision
does not need to be negative with respect to the selection of the best students to
attend medical school. Socioeconomic variables, such as income or parents
education, might represent another dimension of the meritocratic component of the
This discussion also sheds light on the inevitable trade-offs between affirmative action programs and a2
meritocratic basis of selection process. Interestingly, in the U.S., the Bakke decision has generally been
interpreted as meaning that medical (and law) schools cannot use quotas but can practice affirmative action,
i.e., could use race as a positive factor in admissions decisions. Gruhl and Welch (1990) have shown that
the Bakke decision had relatively little impact on black and hispanic enrollments.
See Kohn, Manski and Mundel (1976).3
Initially, there were 1,993 new applicants. The other applicant categories have missing values on some4
key variables (mainly for applicants outside Québec) and represent a very heterogenous group that is mostly
treated case by case by the admissions committee. Those excluded represent about 14 % of the enrollment
at the medical school.
In Québec, students go to college after having completed high school and before beginning university.5
admissions process not entirely captured by objective tests. Arbitrary decisions,
however, lack the transparency of objective tests and may be prejudicial to specific
types of students.
The admissions procedures employed at the Université de Montréal are similar to
those employed at other Canadian or American medical schools with some variants,
particulary with respect to the interview component which is not used by all medical
schools. Medical schools specify their conditions for the selection and admission of
applicants in their student guide. They also inform the various category of applicants
of their probability of being accepted. These admissions criteria are tested in this
paper with a formal statistical model and by the means of additional descriptive
statistics. What all medical schools share is the difficulty of having to choose among
different categories of applicants and to evaluate the merits of one type of applicant
with respect to the others. A comparison among the various categories is not a trivial
issue whenever entrance quotas are present. The common entrance quota maintained
by medical schools, at least in Canada, is to admit a variety of applicants including
college students, students with or without university degrees. The purpose of these
quotas is to encourage especially bright students to enter medical school early, while
at the same time ensuring that not too many immature candidates populate any
particular medical class. The increasing diversity in the ethnic, socioeconomic, and
educational backgrounds of applicants poses a major challenge for admissions
committees in all disciplines with entrance quotas. Final enrollment results from a2
process of mutual selection. Admitting the best does not necessarily mean enrolling3
the best. This dimension of a mutual selection process must also be considered as a
part of the admissions process.
The data consist of 1,647 applicants to medical school for the fall of 1987. We have4
broken down these applicants into three categories : the college students, the5
university students without a degree and the university students with a first degree.
Over the 1978-1979, 1989-1990 periods, the admission rates of all Canadian faculties of medicine have6
ranged from 21% to 25%. Québec and Ontario faculties of medicine have generally shown admission rates
lower than 10 %. See the Canadian Medical Education Statistics published by the Association of
Canadian Medical Colleges, 1990, Vol. 12, for more details.
We constrained our sample to the applicants living in Québec. There are 93 % of the applicants who7
resided in Québec at the time of their applications to medical school.
Of these applicants, 13 % gained admission and of those admitted, 72 % enrolled.6
Information was collected on the sex, age, native language and citizenship of
respondents as well as on their results on a series of scholastic aptitude and admissions
tests.
We have no direct measure of the socioeconomic status of the applicants. Note,
however, that the admissions office of the Université de Montréal medical school did
not have this information either. Socioeconomic status could therefore not have been
used directly as a criterion for admission. We nevertheless attempt to include a
measure for socioeconomic status by using aggregate statistics on employment,
education, income and family structure derived from the socioeconomic characteristics
of the applicants current address.7
The analysis of the determinants of admission to medical school using this data set
enables us to test not only whether the admissions process is free from discrimination
and arbitrary decisions, but also whether the extensive testing that the medical school
does as part of the admissions process is necessary as a supplement to the already-
available information on the prior academic performance of the applicants at college
or university.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the data and descriptive
statistics. Section 3 offers a descriptive overview of the decision model. Section 4
proposes a formal statistical model and section 5 discusses the empirical results.
Section 6 provides the final remarks.
2. THE DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Table 1 presents the symbol and definition of the variables used in the study. Gender
(GENDER), age (AGE), citizenship (CITIZEN) and mother tongue (MTONGUE) are
personal characteristics of the applicants. Next, we have a series of test scores and
Z-score = (X - M)/S, where X is the students grade at college (university); M is the grade average of8
students having taken the same course, the same term, in the same group, in the same college (university);
S is the standard deviation. Once the Z-score for each course has been computed, the average of all Z-scores
for one student is determined.
If the applicant has more than 50 university credits, only the university Z-score is applied.9
SCGLB = 4]ZGLB + 2]SCT + 4]SCI. These weights are used by the admissions committee.10
variables related to the quality of the applicant. ZGLB is the global Z-score, a linear
combination of the Z-score at college and university levels.8,9
Under the Québec education system, colleges are institutions between high schools
and universities. SCT is the score of the applicant who was asked by the medical
school authority to take an entrance examination consisting of psychometrical tests.
In our sample, only 888 applicants were invited to take the entrance examination. Of
these, 418 were interviewed and a SCI score was given to each one. All these scores
were transformed on a 20 to 80 scale. SCGLB is a weighted global score for these last
418 candidates.10
TABLE 1
The Determinants of Medical School Admission :
Symbol and Variable Definition
Symbol Variable Definition
Variables :
Personal characteristics
GENDER Gender of applicant : 1 if male, 0 if female
AGE Age of applicant
MTONGUE Mother tongue of applicant : 1 if mother tongue is French,
0 otherwise
COLL Academic status : collegian = 1, 0 otherwise
UNIV Academic status : university student without a degree = 1,
0 otherwise
UNIVD Academic status : university student with a 1 degree = 1,st
0 otherwise
ZGLB Global Z-score of applicant*
SCT Score of entrance test*
SCI Score at interview*
SCGLB Global score of applicant**
Socioeconomic variables :
(at the local census level)
MACP Mean number of people in active population 15 years and over in each
zip code area
UNEMR Unemployment rate
PMHS Percentage of working men in the health sector
PWHS Percentage of working women in the health sector
PMLSCH Percentage of men with less than nine years of schooling
PWLSCH Percentage of women with less than nine years of schooling
PMASCH Percentage of men with more than nine years of schooling but with no
university degree
PWASCH Percentage of women with more than nine years of schooling but with
no university degree
PMUD Percentage of men with a university degree
PWUD Percentage of women with a university degree
INCOME Family mean income
MONO Percentage of single parent family
* 20 to 80 scale.
** 200 to 800 scale.
The remaining variables refer to the applicants socioeconomic environment. They
are not drawn from individual data but from 1986 census data corresponding to the
The first three characters of the area zip code represent a set of well-defined and stable regions for which11
socioeconomic data are available.
Interestingly, Lentz and Laband (1989) found that in the U.S., children of doctors are nearly 14 % more12
likely to be admitted into medical school than are comparable nonfollowers. (p. 396)
For college students, the current address is likely to correspond to their home address. For the other13
applicants, we assume that their current address reflects their previous home neighbourhood.
See for example, Borjas (1993) and references herein.14
region of the applicants zip code. For each of these regions, MACP represents the11
mean number of people in the active population, 15 years of age and over, in each zip
code area; UNEMR is the unemployment rate; PMHS and PWHS are respectively the
percentage of men and women working in the health sector; PMLSCH and PWLSCH12
are respectively the percentage of men and women with less than nine years of
schooling; PMASCH and PWASCH are respectively the percentage of men and
women with more than nine years of schooling, but with no university degree; PMUD
and PWUD are respectively the percentage of men and women with a university
degree; INCOME is the mean family income; MONO is the percentage of single-
parent families.
Obviously, these measures of employment, education, income and family structure are
only proxies for the applicants actual socioeconomic position. Implicitly, we are13
assuming that the applicants socioeconomic status can be adequately represented by
the mean status in terms of the dimensions described in the area in which he or she
currently lives. This phenomenon has been referred by sociologists and economists
as the neighbourhood effects.14
Table 2 displays the mean and standard deviation of these variables for those who
applied, those who were tested, those who were interviewed, those who were admitted
and those who enrolled.
This is typically the case for college students. Detailed descriptive statistics for each category of15
applicants is available upon request.
TABLE 2
The Determinants of Medical School Admission - Full Sample :
Mean and Standard Deviation
Variables Applicants
Applied Tested Interviewed Admitted Enrolled
GENDER 0.4699 0.4685 0.4474 0.3923 0.4200
AGE 20.9745
(2.7741)
20.7714
(2.7730)
21.0718
(2.7115)
21.2153
(2.8312)
21.4267
(2.7862)
MTONGUE 0.8361 0.8468 0.8923 0.9043 0.8933
COLL 0.5015 0.5653 0.4617 0.4785 0.4133
UNIV 0.2034 0.1104 0.0981 0.0670 0.0867
UNIVD 0.2951 0.3243 0.4402 0.4545 0.5000
ZGLB 41.3224
(18.5170)
52.1745
(16.4468)
60.8756
(13.8966)
62.4880
(13.4301)
60.2533
(14.4595)
SCT - 50.1408
(17.3594)
58.9330
(15.5125)
59.2392
(15.3754)
59.3533
(14.9958)
SCI - - 50.5335
(16.7740)
63.2488
(10.4032)
64.1133
(10.1238)
SCGLB - - 563.5024
(96.6241)
621.4258
(75.1008)
616.1733
(77.9853)
MACP 402.1075
(100.4166)
402.4336
(99.3693)
401.6459
(101.2487)
406.3589
(103.7809)
404.1667
(103.4704)
UNEMR 4.0475
(1.8105)
4.0633
(1.7961)
3.9571
(1.7076)
3.8901
(1.7290)
3.9486
(1.7888)
PMHS 2.9566
(1.6585)
3.0057
(1.7122)
3.0743
(1.8012)
3.2033
(1.8710)
3.2664
(1.8902)
PWHS 9.7402
(2.5541)
9.8807
(2.5684)
9.9376
(2.5355)
9.9569
(2.5222)
9.9681
(2.4205)
PMLSCH 18.8768
(8.2807)
18.6266
(8.1285)
18.1882
(8.0975)
17.6889
(8.0320)
17.6733
(7.7211)
PWLSCH 22.2478
(8.1990)
22.0851
(8.0568)
21.7088
(8.1061)
21.3852
(8.4383)
21.6845
(8.3938)
PMASCH 65.6654
(7.1746)
65.5823
(7.1667)
65.3323
(7.5853)
65.2105
(7.6485)
64.9317
(7.8826)
PWASCH 68.2580
(6.2648)
68.2289
(6.2075)
68.2510
(6.2806)
68.1605
(6.5508)
67.5198
(6.7690)
PMUD 15.4582
(11.0831)
15.7914
(11.2160)
16.4797
(11.8962)
17.1009
(11.9304)
17.3955
(11.9172)
PWUD 9.4938
(7.1662)
9.6856
(7.2222)
10.0396
(7.5934)
10.4530
(7.5635)
10.7942
(7.7265)
INCOME 37293.3789
(9799.4251)
37379.8266
(9890.1053)
37841.0144
(10640.5914)
38300.4115
(11022.9604)
38420.1733
(11705.0299)
MONO 15.6148
(4.4151)
15.7514
(4.4784)
15.8367
(4.6716)
16.1820
(4.8864)
16.6621
(5.0811)
Dependent
variable
0.5392 0.4707 0.5000 0.7177
Sample size 1647 888 418 209 150
There were 47 % female applicants, but only 39 % of those were admitted. The
mother tongue of 84 % of the applicants was French , but over 90 % of those were15
admitted. The average age of those chosen for testing was somewhat younger than that
of those who applied, but at the interviewing stage, the average age was higher than
that of the applicants, and rose even higher at the admissions and enrollment stages.
The mean Z-scores rose progressively over the stages from application to testing,
to interviewing and to admission.
3. THE DECISION MODEL: A DESCRIPTIVE OVERVIEW
The decisions of the admissions committee are based, at least in principle, on the
series of test scores discussed in the previous section that are related to the quality of
the applicant.
The tree structure of Figure 1 illustrates the decision model that is used. Each node
of the choice tree indicates a decision made by the admissions committee of the
medical school for each applicant.
FIGURE 1
Admission and Enrollment Tree to Medical School
Starting at the top of the tree (applied) and moving toward the bottom (tested,
interviewed, admitted), the members of the committee determined which branch each
applicant would take. The first decision at node 0 is to allow an applicant to take
a test or not. At node (2,3), the committee decides whether or not to interview the
Overall, less than 5% have desisted. This percentage represents too few people to add a separate branch16
to each node of the model.
This rule will be taken into account in our estimations using interaction variables.17
In the admissions guide, it is stated that the candidates are asked by medical school authorities to take18
an entrance exam according to their Z-score. It is also stated that based on a global score with weights
6*ZGLB+4*SCT, the candidates are invited to an interview. Finally, the committee decides to admit or not
on the basis of global score of the applicant, SCGLB.
applicant. At node (3,4), the decision to admit an applicant is taken. Up to this point,
the applicants who desisted prior to testing, interviewing and admissions are
considered among those rejected by the committee. At the final node (4,5), the16
applicant who has gained admission decides whether to enroll or not.
In Table 3, we calculate the continuation probabilities for our applicant categories -
college students (COLL), university students (UNIV), university students with a first
degree (UNIVD) - at the different decision nodes.
TABLE 3
Continuation Probabilities at Each Decision Node by Category of Applicants
Category of Applicant Tested Interviewed Admitted Enrolled
College students (COLL) 61 % 38 % 52 % 62 %
University students
(UNIV)
29 % 42 % 34 % 93 %
Graduate university
students (UNIVD)
59 % 64 % 52 % 79 %
Of particular interest is the fact that 61 % of the college applicants were invited to take
the entrance examination; however, only 38 % of those tested were invited to the
interview. For the university students, only 29 % were tested, but 42 % of those tested
were interviewed. For the graduate university students, 64 % were interviewed, and
52 % of those were admitted. How do we explain some of these discrepancies of
Table 3 among the different categories of applicants? As we indicated at the outset of
this paper, a rule in many medical schools is to admit a given percentage of each of
these categories. A fundamental related question is : what category of applicant is17
most adversely affected by these quotas and why? Does the medical school follow its
own stated rules?18
In Tables 4.1 to 4.3, we rank the candidates in descending order (college, university
and graduate students) according to their global score at each of the decision nodes.
TABLE 4.1
Tests and Cessations by Categories of Students
and Their Global Score (ZGLB) Ranking
Tested Not Tested Total
College students (COLL)
Rank # 502 480 22 502
Rank > 502 22 302 324
Total 502 324 826
University students (UNIV)
Rank # 98 92 6 98
Rank > 98 6 231 237
Total 98 237 335
Graduate students (UNIVD)
Rank # 288 263 25 288
Rank > 288 25 173 198
Total 288 198 486
TOTAL 888 759 1,647
TABLE 4.2
Interviews and Cessations by Categories of Students
and Their Global Score (6 ] ZGLB + 4 ] SCT) Ranking
Interviewed Not Interviewed Total
College students (COLL)
Rank # 193 183 10 193
Rank > 193 10 299 309
Total 193 309 502
University students (UNIV)
Rank # 41 40 1 41
Rank > 41 1 56 57
Total 41 57 98
Graduate students (UNIVD)
Rank # 184 164 20 184
Rank > 184 20 84 104
Total 184 104 288
TOTAL 418 470 888
It was suggested that some applicants Z-scores were discounted on the basis of the educational institution19
where they were obtained. Although, since 1989, the Z-score has been officially corrected by the
perceived quality of the college, this was not the situation for our sample of applicants in 1987. If weights
were used at that time to adjust the Z-scores, it was not stated in the medical school guide for applicants.
TABLE 4.3
Admissions, Enrollments and Cessations by Categories of Students
and Their Global Score (SCGLB) Ranking
Admitted Enrolled Desisted Not
Admitted
Total
College students (COLL)
Rank # 100 84 (52 32) 16 100
Rank > 100 16 (10 6) 77 93
Total 100 (62 38) 93 193
University students
(UNIV)
Rank # 14 13 (12 1) 1 14
Rank > 14 1 (1 0) 26 27
Total 14 (13 1) 27 41
Graduate students
(UNIVD)
Rank # 95 79 (62 17) 16 95
Rank > 95 16 (13 3) 73 89
Total 95 (75 20) 89 184
TOTAL 209 (150 59) 209 418
In Table 4.1, we consider the tested-nontested decision by the committee. Of the 502
college students who were tested, 22 students (4 %) were not among the top-ranked
502 college students according to their global Z-score. This was also the case for 25
of the 288 tested graduate students (9 %). In Table 4.2, we describe the situation for19
the interview/noninterview component of the admissions process. Here, 20 of the 184
interviewed graduate students (11 %) were not among the first 184 best graduate
students following their global score at that stage. Finally, Table 4.3 shows that a
strong performance by the medical school committee in admitting and enrolling the
best is achieved for the category of university students. Only one of the first 14 top-
ranked university students was not admitted and a single student refused to enroll. The
school performance and cognitive abilities are not as good for the other categories.
For the college students, 16 (16 %) who were admitted did not rank among the top
100, and 32 of the 84 (38 %) best college students admitted decided not to enroll at
the school. For the graduate students, these proportions are : 16 (17 %) graduate
students admitted were not among the first 95 top-ranked of that group and 17 (22 %)
among the best 79 admitted have not enrolled. Finally, if we list the 209 applicants
The presentation of the sequential-response model borrows from Amemiya (1975). For an interesting20
study of sequential binary models applied to access to the higher education institutions, see Weiler (1986).
(3)
among the 418 interviewed by their global score (SCGLB), we note 119 college
students, 29 university students and 61 graduate students. Therefore, to get 34
graduate students (95 - 61), the committee had to pass over 19 college students and
15 university students who had scored better than these 34 graduate students.
Subsequent analysis will corroborate the role of the quality of the candidates in the
decision process and confirm or infirm some ot the problems raised in this descriptive
overview.
4. A SEQUENTIAL PROBIT MODEL
The sequence of decisions of the structure of Figure 1 and the dichotomous character
of the dependent variables refer to a sequential-response model. The sequential-20
response models are easy to handle as the probability of choice at each stage is
independent of the choice at the previous stage. To estimate the sequential- response
models we maximise the likelihood functions of dichotomus models repeatedly.
Equation (1) which represents the utility of the committee and of the applicant at the
end of the process is defined as :
U = V + , , (1)ijkl ijkl ijkl
with a systematic part
V = $NX + "NY + (NZ + *NW , (2)ijkl i j k l
where X , Y , Z and W refer to the vectors of explanatory variables specific toi j k l
alternatives i, j, k, and l, respectively. , is the random part of the utility with theijkl
error terms assumed to be independent and identically distributed.
As for any binary model, utilities are associated with the node to which the branches
lead. At node (2,3) of the tree structure of decisions of Figure 1, for example, the
committee decides whether or not to interview the applicant with utilities U and U .2 3
At node (4,5), the applicant enrolls if U > U . The probability P for the l-th4 5 ijkl
alternatives to be chosen is
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
If we assume each choice is made according to a dichotomous probit model and
consider :
y=1, if the candidate was not invited to take an entrance test
y=2, if the candidate has been tested, but not interviewed
y=3, if the candidate has been interviewed, but not admitted
y=4, if the candidate has been admitted, but not enrolled to medical
school
y=5, if the candidate enrolled to medical school,
then the probability of applicant being tested, P , is :i
where L represents a binomial probit function.
Similarly we define P the probability that the applicant is interviewed, P thej k
probability of being admitted to the medical school and, finally, P the probability ofl
the applicant to enroll.
The parameters $, ", (, and * are obtained successively by estimating equation (4)
with all observations in the sample (1647 observations at node 0), equation (5) with
all observations for which y  1 (888 observations at node (2,3)), equation (6) with
all observations for which y  1 and y  2 (418 observations at (3,4)) and, finally,
equation (7) with all observations for wich y  1, y  2 and y 3 (209 observations at
node (4,5)).
5. THE EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Table 5 presents the results of the sequential probit model. It shows that the quality
of the applicant is a positive determinant in all steps leading to admission at the
medical school of the Université de Montréal. Despite the importance of the test
scores in the admissions process and relatively good pseudo-R s, some problems2
detected in the descriptive statistics were confirmed in the formal analyses of the data.
TABLE 5
The Determinants of Medical School Admission :
Results from the Sequential Probit Model
Variable Estimated Coefficient (Standard Error)
Tested Interviewed Admitted Enrolled
GENDER -0.20198 0.36946 -0.01190 0.17735
(0.2119) (0.3438) (0.7754) (0.2259)
GENDER*COLL 0.30203 -0.58964 -0.28651 -
(0.2435) (0.3834) (0.8329)
GENDER*UNIVD 0.24285 -0.21307 -0.47225 -
(0.2546) (0.3998) (0.8315)
AGE 0.01169 -0.09117 0.12488 -0.11803
(0.0465) (0.0616) (0.1843) (0.0738)
AGE*COLL 0.03006 0.28262* 0.01960 -
(0.0668) (0.0964) (0.2486)
AGE*UNIVD -0.00040 0.10503 -0.23373 -
(0.0547) (0.0755) (0.2014)
MTONGUE -0.57381** 0.19327 -0.35001 0.01954
(0.3048) (0.5179) (1.0199) (0.4129)
MTONGUE*COLL 1.10819* -0.32082 0.23929 -
(0.3386) (0.5849) (1.1174)
MTONGUE*UNIVD 0.65424** 0.56925 0.53483 -
(0.3604) (0.5745) (1.1156)
TABLE 5 (continued)
Estimated Coefficient (Standard Error)
Variable Tested Intervied Admitted Enrolled
COLL 0.34939 -3.70935** 0.55087 -1.77560*
(1.3903) (1.9686) (4.7629) (0.6424)
UNIVD 1.31909 -0.56114 6.15892 -1.19388*
(1.2637) (1.6820) (4.0877) (0.5818)
ZGLB 0.07978* 0.07961* 0.02320* -0.04305*
(0.0034) (0.0053) (0.0084) (0.0111)
SCT - 0.05406* 0.00936 0.00303
(0.0042) (0.0064) (0.0072)
SCI - - 0.10643* 0.01347
(0.0094) (0.0105)
MACP - - 0.00114 -0.00159
(0.0017) (0.0019)
UNEMR - - -0.06604 -0.03083
(0.0881) (0.1002)
PMHS - - 0.08930 -0.08007
(0.1024) (0.1070)
PWHS - - -0.06882 0.03811
(0.0473) (0.0483)
PMASCH - - -0.03133 0.13400*
(0.0587) (0.0682)
PWASCH - - 0.00861 -0.13518*
(0.0529) (0.0615)
PMUD - - -0.04132 0.02181
(0.0579) (0.0716)
PWUD - - 0.00712 0.02493
(0.0694) (0.0825)
INCOME - - -0.000002 0.00003
(0.00002) (0.00003)
MONO - - 0.02493 0.02674
(0.0357) (0.0406)
OTHER STATISTICS
INTERCEPT -4.24261 -7.22996* -8.66991* 5.24126
(1.0566) (1.4015) (4.2852) (3.2081)
Log of the likelihood
function
-578.3455 -278.7589 -118.6224 -99.6320
P
2 1116.4217 670.4649 342.2263 49.4917
Degrees of freedom 12 13 24 18
Maddalas pseudo-R2 0.4923 0.5300 0.5590 0.2109
McFaddens pseudo-R2 0.4911 0.5460 0.5906 0.1990
Significant at the 5 % level ** Significant at the 10 % level.
The global Z-score (ZGLB) is very significant in explaining the decision to permit a
college student to take an entrance test. Table 5 indicates that that decision is also
positively influenced by having French as a first language for the collegians
(MTONGUE*COLL).
The results of the entrance test (SCT) and the global Z-score (ZGLB) play a major role
in securing an invitation for an applicant to be interviewed. For college students
being older (AGE*COLL) is also advantageous, but not for the university students
without a degree (AGE). However, the college students are clearly at a disadvantage
at this interview decision node, as shown by the negative statistically significant
dummy variable (COLL). This result is consistent with the information provided in
Table 3.
Among the various scores in the admission equation, only the global Z-score ZGLB
and the interview score, SCI, are significant with the latter carrying a much greater
weight in the decision with a coefficient 5 times larger than the estimate of ZGLB.
This result somehow contradicts the commitees own rules to admit or not on the basis
of the global score or the applicant. Sociodemographic variables are introduced as
determinants of admission on the grounds that the interview might have revealed this
kind of information to the admissions committee. The use of data gathered from postal
districts to infer this information about individuals is crude, but given socioeconomic
clustering, informative. None of these measures, however, are statistically significant.
Even when offered an admissions slot, many candidates decline to enroll. Of course,
some may have been admitted to another medical school and have chosen to enroll
there. For the enrollment equation (last column of Table 5), not all the best decide to
enroll at the Université de Montréal, as indicated by the negative and significant
estimate of the ZGLB variable. This is particularly the case for college students
(COLL). The negative and significant coefficient estimate is consistent with Table
4.3. 32 of the 84 best college students who gained admission desisted. Based on the
postal district data, PMASCH (the percentage of men in a postal district with more
than nine years of schooling but no university degree) has a positive and significant
impact on the decision of admittees to enroll, but PWASCH (the percentage of women
in a postal district with more than nine years of schooling but no university degree) has
a negative and significant impact. If, as is intended, these variables capture the level
of education of the admittees parents, then those whose fathers only completed high
school are more inclined to enroll, while those whose mothers only completed high
school are not inclined to enroll. Further research would be required to determine
what interpretation, material or psychological, could be attached to these results.
Finally, we found no evidence of sex discrimination : all the gender coefficient
estimates of Table 5 were insignificant.
6. IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUDING REMARKS
These proportions are only examples and depend on the medical school degree of confidence in the tests.21
Statistical evidence from the sequential probit model tends to support the hypotheses
that the admissions process was meritocratic and free from sex discrimination. Some
arbitrary decisions were made, however. For example, the decision to permit a college
student to take an entrance examination is positively influenced by having French as
a first language. Information obtained by ranking applicants on the basis of their
global performance also indicates that the medical school failed to admit the best
candidates and that many among the best admitted chose not to enroll.
College students were particulary affected by the committees decisions. Of the 888
applicants who passed the admissions test, 502 or 56.5 % were collegians. Yet, only
12 % of college students gained admission. Thirty-four graduate students admitted by
the committee had a global score lower than 19 college students who were not
admitted. Finally, 38 % of the best college students admitted decided not to enroll at
the school.
The perplexing problem that apparently faced the committee was, given its entrance
quotas, how to get rid of those excellent college students that keep reappearing in all
phases of the admissions process. In more general terms, given that the committee has
different applicant categories by level of education attained and that ex ante it wants
a given proportion from each category in the program, it must find ways to achieve
these quotas. The existence of quotas might also explain the otherwise mysterious
interview effect where, according to the results of the sequential probit, the interview
score seems to matter most in gaining admission  a result that contradicts the
medical school guide for applicants. Quotas also appear to dicourage some of the best
college students from enrolling, whereas all but one of the best university student
accepts the admissions offer by the medical school. These admitted university students
were most likely themselves prior victims of quotas, having been precluded from
earlier entry to the medical school sometime during the past few years ago by better
college students.
If meritocratic ordering among all the applicants is the only criterion that should
matter in the admissions process, how can meritocratic admission best be achieved in
the context of quotas for certain applicant categories? The interview component
(which is certainly costly and not as transparent as one could wish) can be replaced by
a larger battery of positive tests. These tests might include many dimensions of ability
along with cognitive abilities. For example, questions on the level of motivation of
medical work, knowledge of medical-related sciences, questions related to acquired
health experience can be included. If the medical school authority is still doubtful
about the acuity of its tests, a simple solution will be to admit the top 20 % performers
among the applicants and reject the bottom 20 % of the applicants. The remaining
slots could be filled at random from those applicants in the middle range of the test-
score distribution. Finally, the proportion of applicants by different categories21
admitted at the medical school should be determined ex post and not ex ante.
With academic institutions under increasing financial stress and hence (quite apart
from professionally imposed restrictions) often forced to limit the number of doctors
they can train, the existence of entrance quotas makes the choice of the best students
more difficult and critical. This empirical study suggests that a focus on increasing the
importance of objective testing will increase the likelihood of selecting and enrolling
the best applicants.
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